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Private Governance of Knowledge:
Societally-Crafted Intellectual
Properties Regimes
DAN WIELSCH*
ABSTRACT
The evolutionary challenge global society faces is the decentralized
development of legal rules that multilaterally protect social autonomies
from violating each other. At the national level, democratic constitutions
provide for the resolution of conflicts between different normative worlds,
although the focus here is certainly on the protection of autonomies from
political encroachment. However, political constitutions make sure that
legal orders consider a plurality of normative perspectives. In contrast,
international lawmaking can exclusively link to a specific social
rationality, lacking any impartial forum for normative reconciliation.
This is of special importance for the governance of intellectual resources.
The incorporation of international intellectual property protection into
the framework of trade relations has resulted in a unilateral economic
interpretation of intellectual property (IP) rights. This biased
international IP lawmaking does not satisfy the demands of knowledge
production in society and the various types of social interaction requiring
the use of copyrighted material, as the increasing number of
privately-crafted IP regimes indicates. These private regimes reconfigure
property rights in a way that is reflective of the environmental conditions
of knowledge-sharing in social systems. As it seems, constitutionalization
of global knowledge-sharing must take place through the recognition of
the jurisgenerative power of societal rule production together with the
public role of private law in the judicial review ofprivate ordering.
Under conditions of normative fragmentation, the constitution gets
dispersed into ecological integrity rules that take account of the
multilateral social effects of rights.
* Professor of Law, University of Cologne; LL.M Berkeley 2003; Dr. iur. Frankfurt/M.
1999.
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INTRODUCTION
At the global level, the legitimacy of law cannot be established in
the same way as it is at the national level. In the latter instance, an
impartial justification of legal norms is supposed to be achieved through
procedural universality, which is characteristic of democratic legislation
and which makes possible the equal consideration of all interests
involved. And only here, the juridification of social spheres must comply
with the higher norms of a constitution, and the impact of specialized
legal regimes on the individual is moderated by coordination with other
legal regimes that protect different values and different types of social
interaction.
To be sure, the global world is not devoid of state-made law. For
instance, there is a huge body of international treaties on intellectual
property (IP) that regulate the use of intellectual resources on a global
scale and thereby impact knowledge-sharing in various fields of creative
activity (infra Part I). Yet, without procedural guarantees for
considering a diversity of perspectives and plural values, international
IP legislation can exclusively link to a specific social system. So, when
faced with the increasing economic importance of copyright industries
on the one side, and the concern about massive copyright infringement
activities on the Internet on the other side, the leading industrial
nations decided that these challenges could best be answered by
subsuming international IP protection under the framework of trade
relations. This linking resulted in a mono-functional interpretation of IP
rights according to economic rationality since the trade regime is biased
in favor of economic interests and does not give equal weight to other
normativities. Absent the force of the constitution, state law is
seemingly prone to lacking the normative multilateralism required in
modern differentiated society. There is strong evidence that
international IP treaties do not satisfy the demands of knowledge
production in society and the various types of social interaction
requiring the use of copyrighted material.1 This diagnosis holds true not
only for copyright law, but applies also to other areas of IP law
experiencing the emergence of open licensing-a development that
indicates the need for alternative configurations of user freedoms.
However, the present discontent about IP law in various sectors of
civil society cannot just be blamed on the shrinking influence of national
constitutions. The political constitution as such is designed to control
1. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and Science
Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global Scale, 96 MINN.
L. REV. 1362, 1370 (2012) (diagnosing "a growing conflict between private rights and
public goods at the core of today's most promising research techniques.").
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the activities of a central lawmaker. It leaves open the question of
governing rules for autonomous social rationalities other than the
organized political system. As the approach of "societal
constitutionalism" points out, the issue of how to limit social autonomies
from expanding their specific rationalities to the detriment of other
autonomies has been neglected in the past (infra Part II).2 Given that
the primary function of constitutions in the traditional sense is to
constitute an effective realm for political decision-making in society and
at the same time to restrain political power from encroaching on social
autonomies, the focus was certainly on the protection and the
furtherance of social autonomies. This development was the very intent
of the liberal distinction between state and society. As a matter of
consequence, the question of limitation of social autonomies vis-a-vis
each other was either left unattended or was redirected to the state in
the hope that it would be able to integrate the centrifugal forces of
differentiated society. Aside from the fact that the latter option is not
available at the global level because state regulation is inherently
restrained by the principle of sovereignty, this strategy always
neglected the capacity of institutions to enable social cooperation.
Mesmerized by Hobbes' take on the problem of social order, political
philosophy in the genealogy of constructivist rationalism misunderstood
the grammar of social institutions and underrated the possibilities of a
decentralized generation of order. In contrast, an epistemological
analysis of property rights suggests that decentralized decision-making
generates patterns of practical knowledge for social coordination.
Rather in line with Hume, legal rules must be seen to evolve as the
result of practical experience and social standards. 3
These effects must not be taken for granted, though. They depend
on the constitutional awareness of private law in finding rules ensuring
that private actors, while autonomously pursuing their own interests,
do so simultaneously in the general interest. Such rules were developed,
for example, in the form of competition law, which constitutionalizes the
process of economic competition. As will be argued, global society faces
the evolutionary challenge of developing rules that multilaterally
protect autonomies from violating each other. In the realm of
intellectual goods, the specific difficulty for constitutionalization of
knowledge sharing can only be grasped with the help of a .relational
account of IP rights that acknowledges the interdependencies between
the communicative activity of the individual and the respective cultural
2. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CoNsTITuTIONALIsM
AND GLOBALIZATION 10 (2012).
3. See F. A. HAYEK, The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume, in STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 106 (1967) (emphasizing this point).
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spheres of meaning (infra Part III). The essential means by which the
law reflects on the environmental conditions of knowledge-sharing in
social systems are "rules of access," limiting the scope of exclusive
rights. These rules take into account the multilateral social effects of IP
rights.
The increasing number of privately crafted IP regimes indicates the
social need for access rules that contribute to a robust environment for
cultural knowledge-sharing. In more general terms, access rules are
instances of "ecological integrity rules," which are developed in a
decentralized way in civil society with the help of private law
instruments (infra Part TV). Compensating for the lack of normative
pluralism required by democratic constitutions, civil society occupies the
law in order to preserve the environmental conditions of autonomy.
However, this does not mean that the rationality of the law itself would
have to surrender to the social norms embodied in standards and
private regulatory regimes. In order to qualify as law, privately crafted
norms have to meet the requirements of "public rules of recognition."
Societal constitutionalism then unfolds through the recognition of the
jurisgenerative power of societal rule production, together with the
public role of private law in the judicial review of private ordering.
I. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Subjecting Exclusive Rights to Exclusive Rationality
Most of the international treaties in the field of IP law are designed
to protect the economic rights associated with creative works. Focus lies
on commercializing the use of works by granting exclusive rights to
authors, inventors, and intermediaries. Although the rationale of
international IP protection is therefore quite specific, this economic
rationality is extended to a wide variety of possible uses. Clearly, the
tendency of international treaties is to protect the economic rights
comprehensively. The scope of control of IP rights was extended to ever
more fields of use of the protected work.4 This excessive proliferation of
IP rights is the expression of a "property logic," according to which all
possible positive externalities of use are to be internalized, including
future forms of use that are automatically subjected to the authority of
4. See GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 33, 98 (2010) (describing developments in copyright and
patent law).
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the rights holder.5 On the national level, such logic is, at least in
principle, limited by the constitution because the economic interests of
right holders must be balanced against the access interests of users in
ways that reflect constitutional principles and rights of equal priority.
In contrast, on the international level, the creation of IP rights can grow
largely unchecked. Driven by the claims of strong lobby groups that
often merge with the protectionist interests of states, IP rights
proliferate in number and in scope. A system of checks and balances is
not in place. Quite to the contrary, the public autonomy of users, who
could raise their voices against excessive growth of exploitation rights,
is held in check by the sovereignty of states in foreign affairs. A
remarkable exception is the international protest of civil society against
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA); that protest proved
to be successful insofar as the European Parliament ultimately rejected
the ratification. In this case, broad mobilization within-and
beyond-the digital rights community created pressure to ignite public
debate and render societal deliberation sensitive to competing
interests.6
B. The TRIPS-Framework: Linking IP to Trade
The basic idea of international treaties in the area of IP is to provide
effective protection to authors whose work is used abroad. Multilateral
treaties among states compensate for the consequences of the principle
of territoriality that limits an IP right to the territory of the state
granting it. In the late nineteenth century, the major IP treaties-the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works from
1886 and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
from 1883-were built around two basic principles: first, signatory
states had to provide in their domestic law certain minimum levels of
intellectual property protection ("substantive minima"); second, as a
general rule, a signatory state was obliged to offer protection to
5. See also Michael A. Carrier, The Propertization of Copyright, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 345 (Peter Yu ed., 2007).
6. See, e.g., Thank You SOPA, Thank You ACTA, EuR. DIGITAL RTS. (July 4, 2012),
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/numberlO.13/good-bye-acta (commenting on the EU Parliament
vote against ratification of ACTA). See generally Leonhard Dobusch & Sigrid Quack, Framing
Standards, Mobilizing Users: Copyright Versus Fair Use in Transnational Regulation, 20 REV.
INT'L POL. ECON. 52, 71 (2013) (describing the actors and structures of the recent phase of
political and social conflict over copyright).
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nationals of other signatory states that matched the protection it
afforded its own nationals ("national treatment").7
That is, although international copyright law required Member
States to enact laws meeting certain minimum standards, the existence
and scope of protection in any copyright infringement action is
determined by the content of national law. 8 Thus, under this model,
Member States retain significant leeway to implement those standards
in ways that remain consistent with their national legal traditions and
their social, cultural, or economic priorities.
However, an early asymmetry in the international copyright regime
needs to be noted. In the Berne Convention, only the minimum standard
of protection was mandatory, whereas exceptions and limitations were
discretionary and without any force in the absence of state action.9 This
reflects the understanding of developed countries that the precise
nature of such limitations was to be left to the reserved powers of the
state to foster the welfare interests' of its citizens.10 Even as the
Convention matured and came to incorporate limitations that had
evolved over time in a large number of states, it maintained its official
deference to sovereign prerogative by making domestic compliance with
the recognized limitations and exceptions voluntary.
This situation has changed remarkably since 1994 with the
conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), which is administered by the World Trade
Organization (WTO). TRIPS consolidated copyright protection with that
of other IP rights in one comprehensive international document and
strengthened its protection by building on top of the acquis of
substantive provisions of the Berne Convention ("Berne Plus"
approach). The most important aspect is that TRIPS introduced IP law
into the international trading system." Stimulated on one side by the
7. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International
Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 994-99 (2002) (providing an
overview of the classical legal regime of international IP law).
8. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 739 (2001).
9. See RUTH L. OKEDII, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, ISSUE PAPER No. 15, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM:
LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1, 8 (2006).
10. See id. at 5. See also P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Contours of an
International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA:
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 473, 474 (Neil Weinstock
Netanel ed., 2008).
11. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 7
(2012).
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increasing importance of copyright industries in the economies of
developed countries, and, on the other side, by concerns about global
piracy of IP made possible by digital technology and online distribution
of content over the Internet, the leading countries of the developed
world decided that these challenges could best be answered by
subsuming international IP protection under the framework of trade
relations. Under WTO/TRIPS, the international copyright legal order
has become, in large part, enforceable. If a nation fails to fulfill
international copyright obligations, this shortcoming may be met by the
imposition of trade sanctions. In particular, the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides for a binding resolution
process bolstered by strong enforcement provisions.12
Due to these instruments, which make legal obligations effective,
the WTO/TRIPS has had a much more profound influence on domestic
lawmaking than prior IP treaties. In combination with the fact that the
WTO forum allows for a faster development of international norms, so
that new technological issues can be tackled proactively instead of just
codifying what is a long standing consensus, the WTO/TRIPS
framework has become the most influential legal source in international
IP law.
Everything then seems to depend on whether TRIPS provides a
sound and balanced framework for IP policy. Linking IP law to the
agenda of free trade seems to limit IP lawmaking to an instrument of
exploiting the comparative advantage in ownership of IP rights.
Whether this concern is reasonable depends on the design of limitations
and exceptions in TRIPS.
By virtue of Article 9(1) of TRIPS, Member States must ensure that
their national laws conform to the norms contained in Articles 1-21
(excluding moral rights) of the last iteration of the Berne Convention. 13
Under these provisions, Member States are permitted to limit the
exclusive rights of copyright holders. These permitted uses could take
different forms, such as constraints on the subject matter of copyright
protection, 14 uncompensated limitations in the form of exceptions to
copyright infringement,15 or compensated limitations in the form of
12. See Myra J. Tawfik, International Copyright Law and Fair Dealing as a User
Right, UNESCO E-COPYRIGHT BuLL., Apr.-Jun. 2005, at 1, 8, http://unesdoc.unesco.org
/images/0014/001400/140025e.pdf.
13. See id. at 1, 9-10, (explaining the interplay between TRIPS Articles 9(1) and 13 and
the Berne Convention).
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 2(4), 2(8),
2bis(1) B.C., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
15. Id. at art. 2bis(2), 9(2), 10, 10bis BC.
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compulsory licenses.16 These provisions are supplemented by the
stand-alone provision of Article 13 TRIPS, which is modeled on Article
9(2) BC and defines limits on the discretion and means by which
Member States can constrain the exercise of exclusive rights conferred
either under the Berne Convention or under TRIPS itself. Every
limitation or exception needs to comply with a three-step test stating:
"Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to the exclusive rights
to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the right holder."17 This test also made its way into Article 5(5) of the
European Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC, which explicitly recognizes
in recital (44) that the exceptions and limitations provided for in this
Directive should be exercised in accordance with international
obligations.18
C. Problems of a Unilateral Economic Interpretation of the Three-Step
Test
Taking into account the importance of this test, it might be
surprising that as of today there has been only one decision of an
international adjudicative body interpreting either Article 13 TRIPS or
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. In a dispute resolution proceeding,
initiated by the European Union, a panel of the WTO in June 2000 held
that Section 110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which exonerated all
commercial establishments that broadcast music to the general public
from copyright royalty payments, was not in conformity with the
obligations of the United States under Article 13 of TRIPS.19 In
comparison, the main impact of the three-step test on adjudication
occurs at the national level, where the domestic courts are obliged to
construe national legislation in accordance with the three-step test as
part of international or supranational law. 20 The reasoning of the Panel
deserves special attention for two reasons. Since other international
instruments, such as the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization
16. Id. at art. 11bis(2)-(3), 13 BC.
17. Id. at art. 13.
18. Green Paper: Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, at 5, COM(2008) 466/3 final
(July 16, 2008) (affirming that the three-step test "has become a benchmark for all
copyright limitations").
19. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R 1
6.1 (June 15, 2000).
20. See Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int'l A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R.
1-6569 (demonstrating that the European Court was not required to consider Art 5(5) and
the meaning of the Three-Step Test).
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(WIPO)21 Copyright Treaty22 and the WIPO Performers and
Phonograms Treaty,23 as well as the supranational instrument of the
mentioned EC Information Society Directive, 24 have adopted the three-
step test, the WTO Panel decision not only represents an important
element of a truly transnational copyright law, but also demonstrates
the problematic nature of the three-step test as an instrument for
achieving a balanced copyright law on a transnational scale.
With regard to the second criterion, the Panel held that permitted
uses are in conflict with "normal exploitation" whenever they enter into
economic competition with the ways that right holders normally extract
economic value from that copyright and thereby deprive them of
significant or tangible commercial gains. 25 To assess the impact of the
exempted use, the Panel does not merely want to consider the forms of
exploitation that currently generate revenue, but also those which in all
probability are likely to be of importance in the future. 26 Thus, the
Panel expressly introduces a normative approach to defining normal
exploitation that includes a dynamic element capable of taking into
account technological and market developments in favor of the right
holder.27 Consideration of both actual and potential effects on
exploitation is motivated by the reasoning of other WTO panels, which
stated that proof of actual trade effects was not an indispensable
prerequisite for a finding of inconsistency with the national treatment
clause of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) where there was the potential of adverse effects on competitive
opportunities for foreign products.2 8 Although the Copyright Panel was
well aware that, as a result, it was going to interpret TRIPS in the light
of concepts developed for GATT and the General Agreement on Trades
and Services (GATS), it assumed the legitimacy to do so from the fact
"that the agreements covered by the WTO form a single, integrated
legal system."29
21. See WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/portallindex.html.en (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
22. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art 10, Dec. 20, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
23. World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty
art 16(2), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
24. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC) ("[O]n the harmonisation
[sic] of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.").
25. Panel Report, supra note 19, at 1 6.183.
26. Id. at 1 6.180.
27. Id. at 6.178.
28. Working Party Report, Brazilian Internal Taxes, June 30, 1949, GATT B.I.S.D.
11/181, 185, aff'd inter alia Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. 34S/136, 158.
29. Id. at T 6.185.
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From the perspective of a WTO panel, this approach makes perfect
sense, as the agreements under the WTO umbrella need to be
interpreted both consistently with each other and in the light of free
trade, as the main thrust or idde directrice of this piece of international
law. Yet, from the perspective of a balanced copyright scheme,
"reference to future exploitations runs the risk of paralyzing exceptions
every time a technical evolution allows [the] controlling of previously
uncontrollable uses."30 In the digital age, a "broader range of means of
exploitation of copyright works becomes technically feasible, [so] the
scope of the potential 'normal exploitation' of a copyright work
correspondingly increases and, if a restrictive approach to the second
step is adopted, the discretion of states (and courts) to maintain
appropriately fashioned exceptions is" reduced.3' For instance, using a
copyrighted work in digitized form could invoke a multiplicity of rights
that were irrelevant to the personal use exception in the print context.
If downloading copyrighted works to use for private research or other
personal use requires the right of reproduction, display, performance,
and/or distribution, the rights holder will argue that any translation of
the personal use exception into the digital environment deprives him of
a realizable commercial gain from the new uses involved. Indeed, some
national courts have already invoked the three-step test in a manner
that constrains the scope of national exceptions in the face of
technological development, arguing that a potential loss of income
arising as a result of digital modes of exploitation was sufficient alone to
place a user's activities outside the scope of a statutory exception. 32
This dynamic reading of "normal exploitation," which extends
copyright to new forms of use, exactly matches the mentioned "property
logic" in IP law.33 It precipitates a copyright maximalism because it
forecloses a corresponding dynamic design of limitations in reaction to
new technological and social developments. Thus, the present
international adjudication of the three-step test under TRIPS
unilaterally links the rationale of IP rights to the economic system.
30. Christophe Geiger, Implementing an International Instrument for Interpreting
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 627,
634 (2009).
31. Jonathan Griffiths, The 'Three-Step Test" in European Copyright Law: Problems
and Solutions, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 428, 441 (2009).
32. See Comment, France: Intellectual Property Code, Arts.L.122-5, L.211-3; Berne
Convention, Art.9.2; Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights in the Information Society-"DVD Copy III," 37 INT'L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 760 (2006). Rechtbank Den Haag, March 2, 2005, case no.
192880, LJN AS8778, COMPUTERRECHT 143 (2005). For a comment on these decisions see
id.
33. See infra Part I.A.
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The restrictive interpretation of the second step proposed by the
Copyright Panel definitely frustrates the achievement of an effective
balance between the protection of rights holders' economic interests and
users' interests in access when taking into account the cumulative
reading of the three steps, each being a separate and independent
requirement that must be satisfied. According to the Panel, "[flailure to
comply with any one of the three conditions results in the exception
being disallowed."34 Such cumulative nature of the three-step test would
aggravate the problem of a restrictive interpretation of the second
condition since an infringement of the second step would necessarily
foreclose any justification of the limitation under the third criterion,
which requires the limitation to "not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder."35 Even if the third condition
were construed in line with the equivalent tests contained in Article 17
of TRIPS (for trademark law) and Article 30 of TRIPS (for patent law),
and even if it were thus possible to take into account not just the
economic value of the exclusive right but also other legitimate interests
(as the Copyright Panel declined to do),3< an examination of competing
public interests underlying the limitation could simply not take place.
As has been warned, there is a danger that the prohibition on all
conflict with the "normal exploitation" of a work will assume
undesirable "showstopped" status.37
To address this problem, various strategies have been proposed. One
tries to lessen the restrictiveness of the second condition by proposing
that a conflict with normal exploitation should only be assumed when
uses covered by an exception make very substantial incursions into a
copyright owner's potential market. 38 Another idea is to extend the
normativity of the second criterion beyond economic interests so that
any limitation that accords with competing considerations of copyright
law and its fundamental values would not conflict with a normal form of
exploitation.39 Perhaps the approach most likely to be considered by a
34. Panel Report, supra note 19, at 6.97.
35. See Geiger, supra note 30, at 636-38.
36. See Panel Report, supra note 19, at 6.227 (explaining that the Copyright Panel
confined interests to the economic value of the copyright).
37. See Kamiel J. Koelman, Fixing the Three Step Test, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
407, 410 (2006).
38. See Martin Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual
Property Rights?-WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three Step Test in Copyright
Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 407, 437 (2006).
39. See Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, Declaration on a
Balanced Interpretation of the 'Three-Step Test" in Copyright Law, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL.
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future panel emphasizes "[t]hat the three-step test constitutes an
indivisible" whole, with the consequence that "[t]he three steps are to be
considered together and as a whole in a comprehensive overall
assessment."40 This way it seems possible to justify some prejudices in
light of values deemed superior to the interests of the right holder. In
fact, under such an approach the three-step test would be transformed
into a proportionality test that in principle allows for a balance of
economic and social interests.
However, even if it is possible to construe the three-step test in
specific cases in a way that considers a legislator's intent for a diverse
cultural domain, the test will always act as a "limit for limitations."41
That is, the test is structurally biased in favor of economic interests
because every proposed limitation has to be justified before the forum
for the protection of economic exploitation. As a consequence of this
built-in preference rule, conflicts of use that ultimately point to conflicts
between different social rationalities are not modeled impartially under
the trade framework. In contrast, under a national constitution the
interests of rights holders, as well as those of users, can be linked to
different fundamental rights that are, in principle, of equal normative
weight.
In addition, TRIPS reduces the person of the rights holder to homo
economicus, because it only deals with the economic exploitation of
exclusive rights. In consequence, there is no room to differentiate
between the creative author as the original right holder and
professional exploitation entities as subsequent right holders.42
Although the interests of both types of right holders often concur, the
concern of authors for the greatest possible dissemination of their works
may sometimes advise protection through a liability rule instead of a
strong property rule, which is preferred by subsequent right holders
seeking to maximize their profit.
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SOCIAL ORDER
Absent the force of the national constitutions, state-made law is
seemingly prone to a normative unilateralism. This diagnosis holds true
not only in the area of IP law. Generally, in international law there is a
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 707 (2008), for "a declaration of experts that aims to confirm
the legitimacy of a balanced interpretation of the 'three-step test."' Id.
40. Id. at 711.
41. For this functional characterization of the test, see MARTIN SENFTLEBEN,
COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP
TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAw 1 (2004).
42. For a discussion of this differentiation see id. at 708-09.
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tendency to develop "self-contained" legal regimes that are
characterized by "international law's contractual bias: where a matter is
regulated by a treaty, there is normally no reason to have recourse to
other sources."43 The normative program of treaties may then be
exclusively subject to a specific social rationality, with the effect that
the respective social autonomies are afforded protection from
intervention by national policies. This amounts to the transnational
extension of the liberal distinction between state and society and
reinforces the commitment of political constitutions to restrain political
power from encroaching on social autonomies. The idea of political
constitutions, however, leaves open the question of constitutional rules
for autonomous social rationalities other than the organized political
system; the issue of how to limit social autonomies from expanding their
specific rationalities to the detriment of other autonomies has been
neglected in the past. It is, therefore, questionable whether the
traditional idea of constitutionalism is really able to provide for the
normative multilateralism required in modern differentiated society. As
it appears, the shortcomings of the traditional model are caused by
reducing the problem of social order to the issue of dealing with the
phenomenon of power in social relations. The resulting fixation on the
law of the state underrates the possibilities of a decentralized
generation of order through social institutions that operate on the basis
of property rights. Evolving from social norms, societal rules of property
may then be regarded as the building blocks of alternatively created
normative worlds that may be more in line with the needs of the
different social spheres of meaning production affected by-and based
on-IP rights.
A. Models of Constitutionalism
The problem of social order is attributed to Hobbes and his analysis
of modern society. According to the political philosophy of Hobbes,
society is composed of individuals that are driven by a plurality of
passions.44 In addition, man is equipped with reason, but reason is only
43. Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, 1 128, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006). In a broader sense, the term is used to refer to interrelated wholes of primary and
secondary rules that cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be
covered under general law. See id. at 1 123.
44. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 39 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651) ("But
whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for hi spart
calleth Good . .. There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule
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a servant to passions. It is the faculty of devising ways and means to
achieve what is desired but provides no restraining control of action.
Given that actions of men are potential means to each other's ends and
that power is the ability to command the actions of other men, the
acquisition of power becomes a proximate end for each individual.
However, if no limitations on the use of means exist,. social relations
would dissolve into an unlimited struggle for power in which the
attainment of the ultimate, diverse passions would be impossible.45 To
overcome this natural state of ubiquitous power wars, men agree by
contract to cede their natural liberty to a sovereign authority that in
turn guarantees them security through the monopoly of power acquired.
Thus, society is conceived of as being ordered by accession to a social
contract in favor of a single entity.46 This entity, itself not being party to
the contract, automatically becomes a solitaire of power since all the
parties divest themselves of a presumed ius in omnia et omnes.47 Hobbes
teaches a lesson in institutionalization. However, this
institutionalization is artificial; its creation by way of waiver results in
epistemological emptiness. The central actor can do everything, but
knows nothing, because aggregated knowledge of men remains in
society.
Framed in such a way, the problem of social order appears as a
problem of coping with power in society. The main idea is to concentrate
the decentralized societal sources of power in an artificial body of
sovereignty. Once created, the political body is expected to be able to
normatively integrate society. 48
Political power is channeled "backwards" through society primarily
by positive law as a medium. In a democratic state, the law is conceived
of as being contingent on political will and receives its legitimacy from
the legislative procedure.49 In principle, lawmaking is being centralized
of Good and Evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the
Person of the man').
45. See 1 TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 93-94 (1937).
46. See WoLFGANG KERSTING, DIE POLITISCHE PHILOSOPHIE DES GESELISCHAF'SVERTRAGS
[THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT] 85 (1994) (Ger.) ("horizontal contract of
subjection," translated).
47. See HOBBES, supra note 44, at 120 ("[I]t is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the
same person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every
man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to
this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him,
and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.").
48. For a critique of Hobbes, see Jurgen Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUE 217, 269 (Kenneth Baynes trans., 1988).
49. This procedure in turn is constituted in the form of law. See JORGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 110 (William Rehg trans., 1996), for such "democratic positivism."
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parallel to the monopolization of power. To be sure, the legal forum of
the state knows individual rights as a source of law made by private
actors. However, the rule of recognition, in the hands of the state, is
thought to guarantee impartiality, since procedural universality springs
from democratic generation of law as the expression of the "united will
of the people."50
Subjecting politics to democratic procedure is just one method of
dealing with the follow-up problems of creating a specialized and
independent (autonomous) sphere of collective decision-making. Policies
also need to comply with the rule of law, which requires laws to take the
form of general rules that are universally applied.5 1 Finally, the scope of
issues that are exposed to politicization and regulation needs to be
limited. In short, there must be safeguards that in turn limit the power
of the autonomous center. The historical answer is the evolution of a
constitution for the political body. Constitutions support the abstraction
of state power as an autonomous social commodity,52 and, at the same
time, restrain political power from pathologically expanding into social
autonomies. Constitutions "create boundaries between politics and its
social environ[ments]," most importantly with the help of fundamental
rights. 53
In sum, the traditional concept of constitutionalism is deeply linked
to Hobbes's qualification of the problem of social order and how to deal
with the use of force against others in rational pursuit of individual
goals. The solution is to establish a central authority-the state-that
normatively determines what is binding for each member of the
collective. In the light of social contract theory, social cooperation is, in a
way, rebooted by the law of the state. As the newly-constituted
autonomy of the center is itself prone to being used in a self-expanding
way (by falling victim to the logic of power), constitutions came to be
installed as institutions for the self-limitation of this autonomy.
However, this does not change the fact that the capacity for the
generation of order is exclusively located in the state. Quite the
contrary, the existence of constitutionalized politics appears to reaffirm
the plausibility and necessity of a single collective order and a
50. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN [METAPHYSICS OF MORALS] § 46
(1870), for Kant's proposal of the criterion of universality as a test for the lawfulness of
legal norms: whether a law could have arisen from the united will of an entire people.
51. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 206 (1960), for
information on the rule of law.
52. See Chris Thornhill, The Future of the State, in FINANCIAL CRISIS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 357
(Poul F. Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 2011).
53. TEUBNER, supra note 2, at 17.
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centralized form of lawmaking. Political constitutionalism is founded on
the idea that the essence of society is the law.
In contrast, societal constitutionalism challenges the premises of
political constitutionalism. It opens up the perspective and puts the
problem of social order in the context of social evolution. The unleashing
of utilitarian rationality in society and the establishing of autonomous
politics is just part of a general change in the evolution of society that
now differentiates according to function (and not status).54 The
autonomy of social spheres then gets multiplied, as does the problem of
limitation of autonomies. In consequence, the traditional concept of
constitutionalism becomes inadequate since it cannot come to grips with
this plurality of idiosyncratic (and nonsubstitutable) social systems and
with the loss of the state as a guarantor of multi-functional
decision-making and normative integration at the global level.
To overcome this inadequacy, societal constitutionalism-in the
account of Teubner-makes three distinguished moves: (1) applying a
functional analysis to political constitutions, which allows for a
generalization of the function of constitutions (i.e. the double function as
a medium for stabilization of autonomy and limitation of this autonomy
towards social environments); (2) expanding the analysis of processes of
constitutionalization from the political order to other social orders (with
the aim of transferring/re-specifying the insights of functional analysis
to these orders); and (3) claiming that limitation of systemic autonomy
can be effective only as internal self-limitation of the communicative
medium (though initiated only through external pressure).5 5
Societal constitutionalism denotes the idea of coping with the
problems of functional differentiation in a decentralized way. Given that
every function system determines its own identity by an elaborated
semantics of self-reflexivity, Luhmann concludes that the mutual
dependencies of subsystems can no longer be subject to normative
integration.5 6 Accordingly, there are no outside stop rules for the
excessive growth of a particular subrationality (i.e. the maximalization
of the society-wide impact of their communicative media) that may be in
collision with other subrationalities or in collision with its own
self-reproduction. 57 Therefore, societal constitutionalism urges function
54. See Niklas Luhmann, Differentiation of Society, 2 CANADIAN J. Soc. 29, 45 (1977)
(discussing the effects of functional differentiation).
55. See id. at 73.
56. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE COMPANY OF
THE COMPANY] 745 (1997).
57. Growth gets pathologic and turns into destruction if it collides with other social
dynamics. See TEUBNER, supra note 2, at 81, for information on who identifies. In addition
to the two mentioned types of collisions, a third one is "the collision with a comprehensive
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systems to develop internal (self) limitations in analogy to the political
system (separation of powers, rule of law, and fundamental rights). In
the constitutionalization of social systems-a process that usually needs
a lot of social energy-law plays a crucial role because it makes
normatively binding a special type of reflexivity essential for the
strategy of decentralized mastery of differentiation: the observation of
itself as a system within an environment.5 8 Taking on this function for a
system requires that the law itself change its mode of operation. As it
appears, the full range of consequences of the "cognitive turn" of social
development implicated by functional differentiation-that norms no
longer steer the prior selection of knowledge but that, conversely, the
problem of learning adaptation acquires structural primacy 59-has yet
to be explored.
B. Societal Rules of Property
Both on the national and on the international level, binding rules on
the use of resources belong to the kernel of social orders. Obviously, they
must form an essential part of social contract theory since scarcity of
natural resources gives rise to social conflict and fuels violent struggle
for power. From Hobbes to Rousseau, the transition from the state of
nature to civil government is, therefore, marked by the
institutionalization of property rights that is intended to prevent violent
conflict about the use of protected resources. In reality, though, this
account of the origin of property is flawed with the stigma that the
transition perpetuates the preexisting relationships of power. In
consequence, the current scheme of distribution of private property
must either be subjected to binding rules of natural law on
appropriation (Locke's proviso) or be put at the disposal of the emergent
common interest (volontg gdnarale) of the newly-formed collective body
(Rousseau).60 For Rousseau, the rationality of a social order is linked in
the most extreme way to the precondition that particular interests are
erased. The "real foundation of society" is the transcendence of the
individuals into a new person with an emergent will.6 1 Management of
rationality of world society" (by assuming that the subsystems, from their decentralized
perspective, were able to reflect on a macro-rationality).
58. On this type of social reflexivity, see infra Parts III.A. and IV.D.
59. See 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, Die Weltgesellschaft, in SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLARUNG
[SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT] 51, 63 (1975) (referred to in TEUBNER, supra note 2, at
94).
60. See JEAN-JACQUES RouSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT ch. 6 (G. D. H. Cole trans., 1782)
(discussing lawmaking in a republican state).
61. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile ou De l'dducation, Livre V [Emile, or on Education,
Book 5], in 4 OEUVRES COMPLTES [COMPLETE WORKS], 840 (1969) ("Chacun de nous met
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property rules is then put in the hands of the sovereign collective.
Leaving aside the tension of any republican model of law with
fundamental rights of the individual, this may be a convincing
legitimation of governmental power. It does not answer how the
collective body acquires the knowledge for tailoring property rules.
Social contract theory is based on constructivist rationalism. Only
from here does one arrive at the idea of property as a legal construct
within the order of a state (status civilis). An alternative account can be
found with Hume, who conceives of property as being based on societal
conventions. Legal rules, just as moral beliefs, are neither innate ideas
nor conclusions of reason, he argues, but an outcome of practical
experience, artifacts, and standards: "those impressions, which give rise
to this sense of justice, are not natural to the mind of man, but arise
from artifice and human conventions." 62 Law and morals arise gradually
and establish in the course of time "general and inflexible" rules and
principles that restrain the partiality of man.6 3 They acquire force not
by contractual agreement but "by a slow progression, and our repeated
experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it."64 In fact, rules of
this sort (most importantly on the "stability of possession, its
translation by consent, and the performance of promises") must be
recognized before people can come to bind themselves by promise or
contract to any form of government.6 5
In this view, property rules are the product of the evolution of
cooperation. Other than in the social contract model, they may not be
reduced to the negative function of preventing direct force and the
peaceful execution of an existing social order. Rather, they are the
expression of the evolution of conventions and social order. The main
idea of Hume's critique of the social contract is that "the essence of
society is not the law but rather the institution."66 As a positive bundle
of conventions on cooperation, property is only to be ensured by the
en commun ses biens, sa personne, sa vie et toute sa puissance, sous la suprime direction
de la volont6 g~ndrale, et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible
de tout.") ("Each of us puts his goods, his person, his life, and all his power in common
under the supreme direction of the general will, and we as a body accept each member as
a part indivisible from the whole.").
62. See 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 496 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
1896).
63. See id. at 532.
64. See id. at 490. However, if the national IP rules in force are being derogated, no
inconveniencies seem to be the result, but rather an increase in productive cooperation.
65. See F.A. HAYEK, supra note 3, at 114.
66. GILLEs DELEUZE, EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY 45 (Constantin V. Boundas trans.,
1991); see also HUME, supra note 62, at 501 (describing the "establishment of the rule,
concerning the stability of possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to
human society").
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state but not constituted.67 The legislator should not be regarded as the
one who legislates, "but rather first of all the one who institutes."68 The
task of the legislator, then, is not to affirm some preexisting natural
rights but to affirm social conventions. The focus of normative analysis
then shifts to institutions as models of action. In this sense, social
normativity precedes the law.
The consequence of replacing a constructivist concept of property by
an evolutionary account of the rise of law is a kind of epistemological
turn of the problem of social order. If the law must be assumed to
process a model of normativity that is dependent on the cooperation of a
whole network of cognitive and practical conventions and patterns of
behavior,69 then the social function of rights is to be seen in the
generation of generalizable experience as a positive externality to
individual decision-making. In turn, the legitimacy of rights consists in
the possibility of the individual deriving personal advantage from
experience stored in iterations of artificially-constituted relations.
Knowledge is dispersed among a multitude of individuals and their
social practice, and so it can likewise only be made accessible through
decentralized decision-making rights. Accordingly, property rules imply
practical knowledge as processed in society. They do not operate as
instruments to execute social order. Order emerges in the way that
actions and rules are tested and decentralized and the resulting
patterns are reflected.
By emphasizing the epistemological dimension of property rights,
private law comes to the forefront automatically. Private law provides
the normative instruments to make social standards binding and
enforceable; it may promote, as well as put limits on, the jurisgenerative
force of standards. This is of special importance in the realm of
intellectual property, where the exercise of property rights has
repercussions for cultural and scientific evolution. Here, the law by
necessity influences not only the generation of economic knowledge,
since protection is extended to the media of communication that are
constitutive to processes of knowledge sharing in other social systems.
To understand the peculiar problem of constitutionalizing
knowledge-sharing, the multilateral social effects of IP rights must first
be elucidated. This will be the ground from which it becomes clear how
67. See the excellent analysis of Hume's notion of property in Ino Augsberg, Ohne
Gesetz kein Eigentum? [Without Law, No Property?], 11 RECHTSGESCHICHTE [LEGAL
HISTORY] 94, 99 (2007).
68. DELEUZE, supra note 66, at 46.
69. See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Postmodern Condition of Law and Societal "Management
of Rules." Facts and Norm Revisited, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT F1R RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE [JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW] 87, 92 (2006).
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legal reflexivity must be conceived to make sure that property rights are
construed in a way that ensures the integrity of knowledge-sharing in
the multiplicity of social environments of the law.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE-SHARING
A. A Relational Account of Intellectual Property Rights
The specific challenge the legal regulation of intellectual goods is
faced with can be adequately grasped only with a look to the
interdependencies between the communicative activity of the individual
and the corresponding cultural fields of activity. From the perspective of
systems theory, this is a matter of the services that psychical and social
systems provide for one another. The concept of "interpenetration"
describes how different systems reciprocally provide their complexity to
one another for the evolution of their own structures. 70 Usually, IP
scholarship attributes innovation to the creativity of the "individual,"
ignoring that not just systems theory, but other disciplines such as
philosophy of language, discourse theory, and deconstructionism
describe this same individual as highly socially mediated and, in many
respects, decentered. 71
Accordingly, it is essential for IP theory to develop instruments that
consider the specific context of reproduction in which creative works and
new knowledge arise. It is necessary to take appropriate account of
cumulative knowledge, as well as the need to supply basic knowledge
resources that are freely useable by all participating actors. Both factors
can vary depending on the communication system, the generation of
knowledge, and on the conditions of the functioning of the concrete
institution of knowledge-sharing within which the collective creation of
knowledge occurs (e.g. markets, firms, and networks).
To acknowledge the character of intellectual works as social
constructs, IP law should be reconstructed on the basis of a genuine
relation of communication and consciousness. More precisely,
communication and consciousness must be understood as each other's
necessary environment. The development and innovative capacity of
cultural or scientific discourse can be explained only if such
70. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 213 (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker
trans., 1995).
71. This is confirmed by research showing that authorship in the sense as this term is
understood today is neither natural nor inevitable, but a relatively recent phenomenon
that began to take shape in the eighteenth century. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius
and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author', 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426-27 (1984).
926
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE
communications are viewed as forming systems in an environment that
in turn arises out of centers of complexity structured by other
(individual psychic) systems whose complexity can be gained for a
system with the forms of law. The question of how to co-opt individual
consciousness for the purpose of creating systemic knowledge defines
the problem of "knowledge-sharing." 72
One form in which this co-optation of individual capacities for social
systems actually happens is through the granting of property rights to
persons. But that is not the whole story. If intellectual products become
the subject of property rights, this also leads to a peculiar inter-relation
of the cognitive environmental conditions of at least two function
systems: In order to activate the market as a process of search and
coordination,7 3 the possibilities of structural coupling between psychic
systems to other social systems are subjected "at the behest" of the
economic system to the control of the rights holder. 74 The possibilities of
inclusion, feasible on the basis of the nonrival use of intangible goods,
are limited to fewer structural couplings than are possible.
Through the deliberate creation of exclusive rights in relation to the
use of intellectual goods for the sake of artificially introducing scarcity
in them and thereby enabling economic competition for them, markets
gain significance for knowledge-sharing in other systems; conversely,
and this is likely to be overlooked, the functioning of markets
themselves then depends on the preservation of the epistemic conditions
of the functioning of other systems. If the law gives the
knowledge-sharing of a system to markets "as a fief," it, at the same
time, forces the functional conditions of markets into new
dependencies. 75
72. See DAN WIEISCH, ZUGANGSREGELN: DIE RECHTSVERFASSUNG DER WISSENSTEILUNG
[ACCESS RULES: THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING], 31 (2008) (Ger.)
(providing a detailed account of the relational theory of IP law).
73. See generally F.A. HAYEK, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES
IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179 (1978).
74. See WIELSCH, supra note 72, at 4.
75. Competition law is especially aware of this nexus in its concern for the social
process of competition. The guaranteeing of competition in the distributed creation of new
knowledge results not merely from the guaranteeing of property rights. The constant
provision of a repository of publicly useable knowledge and information is equally
important in the functioning of competition. What has been overlooked by Hayek is the
dialectics involved when property rights are created for the sake of competition over
intellectual products: Precisely because competition is installed to spur on creativity and
to further innovation in cultural production, competition becomes dependent on the
conditions of knowledge-sharing in cultural domains. Competition is not an "autarchic"
stand-alone process but withers, as it were, when explicit knowledge cannot be
recombined with distributed tacit knowledge.
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When the form of property is applied to the regulation of the use of
intangibles that possess a communicative function, the law is placed
within a challenging matrix of system-references and needs to organize
its own forms so that the institutions of knowledge-sharing are
supported in the economy as well as in the arts, science, technology, and
other specialized discourses. It has to take seriously the multiplicity of
social references of legal rights. Rights shape the environmental
conditions for autonomous operations of various systems of meaning
production, the autonomy of which translates into normative claims.
Acknowledging the social multi-referentiality of rights should be
nothing new in IP law. Since its inception, copyright law has had to deal
with the difference between moral rights related to the personality of
the author and his economic interests. The approach proposed here asks
IP law to continue developing this impulse of internal differentiation in
response to multiple environmental requirements and to consequently
consider all of the relevant social references of IP rights.
This extension of the law's horizon to the social dimension of legal
forms is not an end in itself. The exercise of individual rights brings
with it the emergence of trans-individual orders. Since these collective
orders in turn decide the actual conditions for exercising individual
autonomy, the effects that the exercise of rights bear on these social
orders present a normative problem for the law. If the social effect of
private law is left unattended, then the law cannot be "adequate" to its
environment, and it ultimately fails to achieve justice.76
B. Rules of Access: Environmental Reflexivity of Law
To enable as well as to preserve the sharing of knowledge essential
for diverse social discourses, the law not only needs to provide for
exclusive rights, but also for "access rules" that fix the conditions under
which users enjoy the freedom to use protected material without
depending on the permission of the right holder.77 The law needs to
acknowledge that the functional conditions of these systems include the
requirement of adequate possibilities for permission-free use of works.
Actually, the co-opting of consciousness for the purpose of creating
systemic knowledge ("knowledge-sharing") must be based on two pillars
of legal institutionalization: on the one hand, this co-optation proceeds
76. See generally Gunther Teubner, Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or
Transcendence Formula of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (outlining an "ecological"
extended notion of justice).
77. Though access need not necessarily be for free, but may be contingent upon the
payment of adequate compensation in which the right holder has a mandatory
participation.
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by way of instituting exclusive rights of use that grant individuals the
chance to exploit the work on the market (so that they can cover the
costs for their qualified "participation" in the respective discursive
system); at the same time, the authority over the medial instantiations
of meaning may not prevent the actualizability of the new systemic
knowledge (through other individuals) to such an extent that further
creative variation in the system is inhibited.78 The exclusive allocation
of possibilities of use to a particular person deprives others from
exploring these possibilities; the freedom of users is normatively
restricted. By putting limits on such limitations of the freedom of users,
access rules prevent the exercise of rights to intellectual goods from
undermining the necessary conditions for the creation of those goods. In
short, access rules decentralize the authority to select the use of an
intellectual resource. They move selection authority to the observation
capacity of users.79 This way, they preserve the environmental
conditions of knowledge-sharing in social systems.
Notably, the economic system itself does recognize the necessity of
limiting the propertization of use of intellectual goods. Economics, the
reflection theory of the economic system, attentively observes the
problems that result from a proliferation of IP rights for the internal
rationality of the economic system. The restriction of the freedom of use
is perceived as a loss of static effieciency resulting from the under-use of
a resource, but also in its negative effects on dynamic efficiency.8 0
Economists have very clearly formulated the dilemma of the
privatization of intellectual goods from the perspective of the economy:
"In a free-enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using
the invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is
successful, there is an underutilization of the information."8 ' The
problem with IP rights is that they inhibit positive externalities of use,
and inhibition of positive externalities occasions social costs. This
insight suggests economic limits for the creation and scope of
intellectual property rights according to a calculus of transaction costs
and property-rights analysis ("economic proviso"). From the perspective
78. See WIELSCH, supra note 72, at 63.
79. For a definition of property rights according to which they assign to particular
individuals the authority to select, for specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of
uses, see Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816, 818
(1965).
80. See Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in
Information Goods Versus The Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267, 271
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
81. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW 104, 112 (1985).
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of the reflection theory of the economic system, rules are required to
restrict rights holders' exclusion right.8 2 To be sure, the nature and
number of these restrictions may not go far enough from the perspective
of society as a whole. The knowledge dilemma as noticed in information
economics only points to access rules from a system-specific perspective.
The societal environment of the law expects justified legal rules that
determine where the boundaries of the authority of IP rights are to be
drawn. The law is thus checked for whether it contains internal "stop
rules," and whether it has developed a kind of "sense for publicness"
with regard to the protection of semantic constructs that exist only as
media artifacts.83 The search for limitations of IP rights within the legal
system itself is thus to be characterized as an "ecological" question, for it
is ultimately aimed at the system's relationship with its environment. 84
In principle, all of the social references of rights, which represent
normative claims of the different social spheres for autonomy, are of
equal priority. In the context of national IP regimes, this is affirmed by
the fact that constitutions contain a plurality of fundamental rights that
all enjoy the same normative weight. Therefore, the constitution
provides the legislator with sufficient normative support for creating a
wide variety of access rules, mainly in the form of statutory limitations
that could be responsive to the characteristics of knowledge-sharing in
different institutions and social systems. However, the legal corridor in
which nation states are entitled to create limitations autonomously is
significantly restricted by the requirements of international treaties,
especially by the three-step test. As mentioned, international law
produces a multitude of legal regimes that are self-contained and only
host a specific normativity.8 5 Given the great impact of the trade regime
82. For limitations on the creation of property rights in general, see Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347, 350 (1967) ("[P]roperty rights
develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than
the cost of internalization."). However, only recently the economic analysis of law came to
recognize that the social costs associated with the creation of intellectual property rights
comprise opportunity costs resulting from the inhibition of positive externalities. See Brett
M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 299-301 (2007).
83. See WIELSCH, supra note 72, at 51.
84. Ecological sensitivity of the law can be achieved on different theoretical grounds,
too. See generally James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for
the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997) (pioneering the idea to transfer insights on
environmentalism to the field of IP policy); see also James Boyle, Cultural
Environmentalism and Beyond, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2007) (a comprehensive
valuation of Boyle's concept of "cultural environmentalism").
85. This is described as the replacement of territoriality by functionality as the
principle of social differentiation. See Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, supra note 43, at
133.
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and its preference for economic interests, the following question arises:
how can the law take care of other social rationalities when it is called
upon to decide legal disputes?
C. Debugging the Three-Step-Test: Connecting TRIPS with Horizontal
Normativity
In response to the economic logic of the WTO scheme and the
corresponding interpretation of Article 13 of TRIPS by the Copyright
Panel, a broader approach is called for. It may consist in contextualizing
the rights and obligations of TRIPS within other international treaties.
In fact, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention even requires taking
into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties."86 With regard to the plurality of
fundamental values underlying copyright law, this especially suggests
considering international human rights.87 Such interplay between
economy-focused international copyright law and international legal
sources that aim to protect other values may substitute for the lack of a
coherent set of fundamental rights backing different social autonomies
as is known from the national constitutions. Different normativities
would then be imported from the outside into the context of WTO-hosted
copyright law. With respect to the socio-cultural dimension of copyright
law, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were suggested as provisions that could, for
instance, guide a broader normative approach in interpreting the
respective steps of Article 13 of TRIPS.88 Both provisions recognize the
right of the individual to participate in cultural life and thereby
emphasize the importance of access to copyrighted material.8 9 In
addition, Article 15 of the ICESCR requires states to let this right
become effective through sustainable protection of the domains of
86. See Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
87. See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2008).
88. See Geiger, supra note 30, at 635.
89. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), at Art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) ('The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life"); see
also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at Art. 27(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement
and its benefits").
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science and culture.90 Inside the normative body of TRIPS, Article 7 and
8 could function as "docking stations" for receiving the normative
mandate of these external provisions: Article 7 of TRIPS ties the
protection of IP rights to the "mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge" in a manner conducive not just to economic
but also to "social welfare."9' Article 8 of TRIPS authorizes Member
States to adopt measures for the promotion of "the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development."
However, one should not be too optimistic about the readiness of
WTO panels to adopt such an "embedded reading" of TRIPS. In the end,
it depends on the trade forum itself to admit the external normativities.
The least one can expect is for the single member states to review the
three-step test and "soften" it by transforming it into some kind of rule
of reason that allows for a balance of interests in an impartial way.
Since state law, therefore, does not seem able to develop access rules at
the global level that could keep in pace with the globalization of function
systems, constitutionalization of knowledge-sharing in the sense
explained rather takes place through the initiatives of private actors.
IV. SOCIETAL IP REGIMES
There is strong evidence that the provisions in international IP
treaties alone do not satisfy the demands of knowledge production in
society and the various types of social interaction requiring the use of
copyrighted material. In the years after the conclusion of TRIPS, it
turned out that the WTO and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), the two big institutional actors in international
IP policy, are not the only authors of IP rules with a de facto global
reach. IP lawmaking on a global scale also occurs-among others-in
"the practices of multinational information industry actors"; in the
adjudication of "national courts [that are beginning to develop] a private
international law of intellectual property"; in the constraints digital
"technology that operates without regard to territory" ("code is law"); in
transnational operating NGOs; and in the activities of new actors who
cooperate in transnational networks. 92
90. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
89, at Art. 15(2) ("The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation,
the development and the diffusion of science and culture.").
91. See Geiger, supra note 30, at 628-29.
92. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New
Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 205 (2006).
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Perhaps the most unexpected development in recent years is the
increase of privately-crafted IP regimes. In copyright law, examples
include Open Source Licensing Models (e.g. GNU-GPL), Open Content
Licensing Models (e.g. Creative Commons), Massive Multi-Author
Collaboration Sites (e.g. Wikipedia), Extended Collective Licenses (e.g.
in the Scandinavian countries), Quasi-Contractual Licenses (e.g. the
proposed Google Book Settlement Agreement), and Copyright Collection
Societies (e.g. the GEMA in Germany). In patent law, one could refer to
Patent Pools (e.g. DVD6C, MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License, SARS
corona virus pool), Standard License Clearinghouses (e.g. Science
Commons), Open Source Genetics (e.g. CAMBIA's BiOS License), and
access and benefit sharing systems (e.g. in ECCO).
In particular, private IP regimes emerge in the course of
collaborative knowledge projects. Here, contributors share the work of
generating piecemeal knowledge and make openly available the outputs
of their efforts for others to use. "Such collaboration can evolve when a
[complex design] task can be partitioned into smaller modules that can
be worked on independently," in parallel, or successively.98
A. Redirecting Legal Form
To interact according to the peculiar operational logic of the project,
contributors use "open licensing models" that constitute project-specific
commons. These models share one main idea: building on their exclusive
rights granted by territorial copyright, creators make use of their
private autonomy and extend the scope of permitted uses beyond the
limitations of statutory IP law. Each contributor to the project
irrevocably grants to everyone in the public broad rights to use his or
her contribution.94
The legal instrument by which the individual contribution is levied
for the sake of the common interest in the project is the "copyleft"
provision that requires each creative user of the publicly licensed work
to license his follow-on contribution in turn under the same open license
terms.95 This provision and the other terms of the open license are to be
93. Dan Wielsch, Governance of Massive Multiauthor Collaboration: Linux, Wikipedia,
and Other Networks: Governed by Bilateral Contracts, Partnerships, or Something in
Between?, 1 J. INTEIL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-CoM. L. 96 (2010) (discussing the
operational logic of knowledge projects).
94. In copyright, for example, this permission can extend to the right to copy, the right
to distribute, and the right to modify the work.
95. See GNU General Public License, Version 2, § 2(b), GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (JUNE
1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013), which contains
a typical copyleft: "You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole
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regarded as conditions of the copyright license. If the licensee fails to
comply with these conditions, then the licensor can bring an action for
copyright infringement.9 6 With the help of this "socio-legal hack," the
exclusive right is not waived, but its function is reversed from the
safeguarding of the prerogatives of the author to the safeguarding of the
freedoms of the user.97 As a result, the right to use the contribution is
decentralized as if a statutory limitation were to apply.
This is the genius of copyleft: due to the fact that now many users
can decide independently on the use of one and the same resource, the
chances for its creative employment-for a follow-on-creation-are
multiplied. The private crafting of a commons moves the authority to
select to the knowledge of the individual user. Thereby networks of open
collaboration ingeniously combine the epistemic qualities of markets
and firms: they spur on a discovery procedure among a dispersed
multitude of independent actors-pretty much the same way as in
markets; yet, at the same time, the access of these individual actors to
resources is extended to much more than a single person would have at
hand-pretty much the same way as in firms.98 Private licensing
models, whether using the copyleft or different instruments, allow for
tailoring access rules according to the logic of knowledge-sharing in
different social discourses.
B. Standards and Normative Orders
To understand the social logic of nonstate IP regimes, it has to be
considered that private access rules become legally binding with the
help of standard licenses. Standards are the building blocks for private
property regimes. The license as such is of no social power; even the
power of the viral license constituted by the copyleft is due to the
standard terms that commit everybody to adopt the same open access
policy. Open licenses are not the expression of individual preferences,
but form part of emergent social structures that are institutionalized to
different degrees. As such, standards have a significant public
dimension that is constituted by their power to control social
or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a
whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License."
96. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), for an example of a U.S.
court affirming the terms of the license.
97. See WIELSCH, supra note 72, at 211.
98. More precisely, access to resources is the same as in very big firms because,
quoting Eben Moglen: "If the GNU GPL were a firm, it would be the single largest
software development firm in the world, far larger than Microsoft." Patrice-Emmanuel
Schmitz, Public Development: Interview With Professor Eben Moglen, SYNERGY, Jan. 2006,
at 10.
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institutions. In the case of IP regimes, standards often determine
behavior in the institution of the network. A more familiar institution
that can be influenced through standards is, of course, the market.99 In
the case of collaborative networks, new types of cooperation and
emergent social structures are enshrined into standard licenses.
As such, the licenses themselves are nested in broader normative
orders, especially in conventions among the participants of epistemic
projects and communities. True, open source software licenses, for
example, can be interpreted not only as technical legal terms of use for
certain software but also as the expression of standards for cooperation.
The license, in this respect, operates as a social contract: "In the absence
of hierarchical authority, the license becomes the core statement of the
social structure that defines the community of open source developers
who participate in a project."100 On the other hand, the license terms
cannot be conceived of as a stand-alone social structure. This becomes
clear from the difficulties legal doctrine experiences when it tries to
capture the obligation to open back-licensing of the user's own
contribution in traditional categories. The paradigm of private law is
constituted by dyadic reciprocity. The copyleft, in contrast, embodies a
kind of abstract reciprocity that is committed to maintaining the
openness of the source code, thereby guaranteeing the integrity of the
specific process of knowledge-sharing. Such reciprocity can be explained
only against the background of the four fundamental freedoms that are
to be granted to the user of free software ("the freedom to run it, to
study and change it, and to redistribute copies with or without
changes"); they constitute the ethical underpinning of the GNU General
Public License.101
C. Self-Institutionalization of Discursive Rationality
The normativity of the four freedoms is closely linked to the
operational logic of knowledge projects. In this context, Hobbes' problem
is just put aside. As mentioned, Hobbes thought of social order as the
management of power. He was unaware of the epistemological
dimension of social institutions. In the context of project-based
99. See Dan Wielsch, Global Law's Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1075, 1080 (2012).
100. STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 179 (2004).
101. See Richard Stallman, Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software, GNU
OPERATING SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2013) ("Open source is a development methodology; free software is a social
movement. For the free software movement, free software is an ethical imperative, because
only free software respects the users' freedom.").
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knowledge sharing activities, his reasoning needs to be turned upside
down. Here, institutionalization builds on knowledge. The management
of knowledge requires leaving knowledge where it resides and providing
it with authority. Knowledge is to be entitled. In fact, the four freedoms
establish a different social basis. "These freedoms are vitally important.
They are essential, not just for the individual users' sake, but for society
as a whole because they promote social solidarity-that is, sharing and
cooperation."102 The abstract reciprocity of the copyleft preempts
strategic action so that activities can concentrate on the generation of
new expert knowledge in the respective discursive network. This way,
the functional logic of cultural or scientific projects can take guidance of
social cooperation. Socialization, then, does not take place through
purposive rationality nor through communicative rationality, but
through the operative logic of the respective discourses-through
systems rationality. Ultimately, the normativities of social systems craft
property regimes.
As it seems, the evolution of private property regimes indicates that
social systems directly author access rules at the global level. Access
rules develop in close responsiveness to the functional logic of specific
projects and the respective practices of knowledge sharing.
Territorially-differentiated IP law is replaced by social conventions of
use. Among the consequences of the "cognitive turn" of social
development implicated by functional differentiation, as diagnosed by
Luhmann, would then be the decentralization of lawmaking. In a
similar way as the rights of use in networks are moved to the individual
capacity of knowledge-recombination (since transfer of knowledge would
be very difficult in practice), so too the authority of lawmaking must be
decentralized and afforded to private regimes governing the use of
intellectual goods. They can be much closer to the functional and
contextual conditions of knowledge-sharing than a legislator. 103
102. Id.
103. However, the scope of involvement of the political system-as compared to an
internal politicization of functional systems-may vary depending on the subject area. On
the constitutionalization of transnational standard-setting in corporate financial
accounting as "controlled interaction of economy and politics through legal means" see
Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and Transnational
Corporate Accounting, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941, 964 (2013) (regarding the
structural coupling of the transnational lawmaking process to the political system as
defining for constitutionalization). Regularly, processes of constitutionalization would
then be trilateral in nature, involving structural couplings between law, politics, and the
respective system.
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In fact, private lawmaking by contractual standards can even lead
to normative worlds that are in conflict with legislation.104 The
teleological vision of an alternative normative world then stipulates a
different order between values as compared with the preference rules of
the state law.105 The privileged official norms generated by acts of state
interpretation are dethroned by interpretive commitments of private
communities and networks. 06 The development of open licenses clearly
shows how social movements are able to inflict different normative
visions on the law and create counter-institutions to incumbent legal
practice. Thus, the transformative power is not immanent to private law
as such, but depends on stout commitment in creating legal meaning
that, in turn, seems propelled by the clash of social rationalities in
modern individuals. When state law claims jurisdiction in such a
situation of challenge by an alternative configuration of rights and
duties, it must be sensitive to these alternative legal regimes, since at
the heart of law's own rationality is the idea of impartiality that
requires the law to frame the questio iuris with due regard to all sources
of normative meaning.107
Therefore, the equivalent for the obligation of the constitution to
equally protect all autonomies from the excesses of politics is the
decentralized development of "ecological integrity rules," i.e. rules that
104. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(concerning the project of Google Books that inter alia tries to set up a legal regime for the
use of orphan works. The access rights Google must claim for this arguably transcend the
scope of fair use. The pending class action of affected authors resulted in an Amended
Settlement Agreement the approval of which was denied by the court on March 22, 2011).
For an analysis of the legitimacy of the proposed private copyright regime, see Wielsch,
supra note 99. What remains troubling, though, is the fact that the private entity claiming
the new rights is not a social movement but a very powerful corporation. However, it is up
to the law to develop recognition rules that ensure that private actors, while
autonomously pursuing their own interests, do so simultaneously in/for the general
interest.
105. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45 (1983) (the
creation of legal meaning ["jurisgenesis"] requires a "commitment to projecting the
understanding of the norm at work in our reality through all possible worlds unto the
teleological vision that the interpretation implies"). Essential for relating these visions to
the normative precepts are narratives: they are the models by which the transformations
can be studied "that result when a given ... state of affairs is made to pass through the
force field of a . . . set of norms," and by doing so they "integrate not only the 'is' and the
'ought', but the 'is', the 'ought', and the 'what might be."' Id. at 10.
106. See id. at 7 ("The normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive
commitments-some small and private, others immense and public. These
commitments-of officials and of others-do determine what law means and what law
shall be.").
107. See Dan Wielsch, Relational Justice, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (2013), for a
discussion on the extension of law's impartiality to social autonomies.
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protect the integrity of system-specific knowledge-sharing from being
subjected to the expansive rationality of another system. For example,
by acknowledging the enforceability of open licensing models, the law
protects knowledge-sharing in arts and science from being enslaved by
the expansive logic of the economy. If one buys into the functional
analysis of constitutionalism, then this refraining of the constitution
only seems to be consequent: if the challenge is to protect social
autonomies against each other (and not just against the encroachments
of politics), then the constitutional function unfolds into decentralized
rules on the constitution and limitation of autonomies. In a societal
constitutionalism, the constitution gets dispersed into multilateral
ecological integrity rules. .
D. Developing Public Rules of Recognition for Societal Normativity
In this perspective, societal constitutionalism unfolds where legal
forms get "socialized" when civil society appropriates the law in order to
preserve the environmental conditions of autonomy. Socialization of
legal forms implies that social normativities seize or "occupy" the
institutional dimension of the law: the law is used to change the law
itself. Social autonomies acquire rights to lawmaking. In a strange loop,
external normativity suddenly comes from within the law. External
pressure transforms into internal rupture of the law; "a reinterpretation
of existing legal rights can effectively challenge prevailing practice."108
Socialization of law unfolds through dismantling the state's monopoly of
meaning.
However, this does not mean that the rationality of the law would
have to surrender to the social norms embodied in standards and
private regulatory regimes. To qualify as law that claims society-wide
validity for each situation the norms are applicable to, the
privately-crafted norms have to meet the requirements of "public rules
of recognition." 09 In other words, alternative normative worlds are
required to engage with existing ones. The focus is, then, not so much on
108. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,
1902 (1987). See Emilios Christodoulidis, Strategies of Rupture, 20 LAW & CRITIQUE 3, 6
(2009), for a discussion on the strategic use of "rupture" as a form of immanent critique
revealing the contradictions of state law (in his opinion, identifring contradictions in the
terms and discourses of the law is transformative in the sense that it "does not restore, but
transcends, the 'disturbed' framework within which it arose'). For a caveat to the processes
of constitutionalization, see Emilios Christodoulidis, On the Politics of Societal
Constitutionalism, 20 IND. J. GLoBAL LEGAL STUD. 629 (2013), arguing that
constitutionalism bears the danger to operate as deadlock to legal reform.
109. See Wielsch, supra note 99, at 1095-1100 (discussing public rules of recognition for
private legal regimes).
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the origin of the norm (public or private), but on whether it meets the
substantial requirements of a general rule of lawmaking. Maybe the
essential question for both kinds of normative orders-statist and
private-is how to ensure that private actors, while autonomously
pursuing their own interests, do so simultaneously in/for the general
interest.110
The specific requirements will have to vary with the extension of the
normative claim of the private standards and their actual public impact
that can consist of third-party effects or even the control of social
institutions."' On the other hand, existing rules of recognition cannot
remain unchanged when faced with these claims. In turn, they have to
be innovated to do justice to private orders and their autonomous
normative claims. On both sides, the private as well as the public, it is
not just a question of exercising private autonomy and of granting it
respectively. Matters are more complex. For instance, where the private
lawmaking process is open and strives for balanced rules in a multitude
of relationships, state law cannot just refer to the usual limitations of
private autonomy and simply dismiss rules with third-party effects.
Another important factor is the public function of the sector-specific
regime; it would have to be affirmed especially in cases where the
private regime can be interpreted to consist of ecological integrity rules.
The public rules of recognition are then prompted to acknowledge this
normative quality and, in consequence, to grant "concessions of
autonomy ... subject to [requirements and] reserved review ([especially
with regard to] criteria, venues/fora, procedures)." 112 It is necessary and
legitimate to ask the normativity of public rules to reconsider itself
because
no closed, correct, substantive ('rational', 'natural')
concept is to be imposed against a 'false' reality, nor
should any reality seek to arrogate an idea of its
correctness, but 'society' (as being restrictively open and
110. See Rudolf Wietholter, Zum Fortbildungsrecht der (richterlichen) Rechtsfortbildung
[Back to the Training of Law (Court) Legal Education], 3 KRITISCHE VIERTEIAAHRESSCHRIFT
FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [THE CRITICAL QUARTERLY MAGAZINE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE] 1, 22 (1988).
111. For details see Dan Wielsch, Global Law's Toolbox: How Standards Form
Contracts, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Horst Eidenmuller ed., 2013).
112. For a discussion of the concept of admissability of freedoms see Rudolf Wietholter,
Just-ifications of a Law of Society, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW 65, 71
(Oren Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., lain L. Fraser trans., 2006).
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capable of learning) is, on the basis of previous
experience, to be exposed to new experience." 3
This is affirmed by a relational account of justice that resolves the
impartiality of law into the obligation to evaluate the social
multi-referentiality of rights and that makes binding the consideration
of all sources of normative meaning.114
Ultimately, societal constitutionalism, therefore, requires a specific
understanding of law. The reflexivity of the law must be able to "learn"
ecologically from the different couplings to its normative environments.
A learning self-reflexivity of the law then has to focus on the conditions
of the "jurisgenerative" processes in society.115 It acknowledges the
claims of private actors for self-regulation by opening up public
normativity for realizing innovative new modes of social action and, at
the same time, sets out requirements that oblige private rulemaking to
reflect on public interest. This might indicate the necessity of an
updated conception of political autonomy under conditions of
decentralized lawmaking: the right to self-government would have to be
reconceived as the right to justification of alternative normative worlds,
met through evolving rules of recognition.116
When Hume started to make corrections of his works after
publication, he changed "laws" into "rules of society" where this seemed
advisable to make his meaning clear.117 Societal constitutionalism may
be expected to agree. However, its approval relies on celebrating the
public function of private law.
113. Rudolf Wiethdlter, Proceduralization of the Category of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: AN AMERIcAN-GERMAN DEBATE 501, 507 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek
eds., 1989).
114. See Wielsch, supra note 107.
115. See PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
BEYOND BORDERS (2012), for an expanded conception of jurisgenerative processes at the
international and the global level.
116. For a discussion on the basic moral right to justification see Rainer Forst, The
Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach,
120 ETHICS 711, 719 (2010).
117. See Raymond Klibansky, Appendix to HUME, THEORY OF POLITICS 246 (Frederick
Watkins ed., 1951). See also HAYEK, supra note 3, at 118-19 (referring to Klibansky's
compilation of the corrections). Cf. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, Die Rechts- und
Staatsphilosophie David Humes [The Rights-and Philosophy of David Humes], in
FREIBURGER STUDIEN [FREIBURG STUDIES] 246 (1969) (Ger.) (where the reference to
Klibansky's corrections is more clear).
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